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Abstract. This paper investigates the translation of Henri Bergson’s philosophical writings in relation 
to the development of the concept of “intuition” (zhijue 直覺) in contemporary Chinese philosop-
hy. As Bergson’s intuition was very soon associated with “the knowledge of/as virtue” (dexing zhi zhi 
德性之知), it turned into one of the basic Chinese modern concepts to think about ethical and moral 
issues. However, Chinese philosophers used Bergson’s intuition as a device of moral philosophy sooner 
than the philosopher himself even started to write his moral philosophy. This paper decrypts the morali-
zation of intuition in Chinese context, and questions the issue related to the formation of the concept of 
zhijue . The key documents put under light in this paper are Chinese translations of “An introduction to 
metaphysics” (1903) and several articles related to Bergson published around 1921. 
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Since its first introduction in 1913, Henri 
Bergson’s (1859-1941) philosophy mes-
merized the Chinese intellectual field (Lai 
1993: 52-144; Wu 2005: 27-42). Bergson-
ism had captured the attention of a young 
generation of intellectuals versed in the new 
knowledge imported from the West. thanks 
to John Dewey’s conferences about “three 
contemporary philosophers” (Dewey 2008) 
held in March 1920 and soon reproduced in 
many periodicals and magazines, Bergson 
was considered as one of the greatest phi-
losophers alive. In fact many intellectuals 
found in Bergson a philosophical ally to 
fight a battle against scientism and positiv-
ism, two intellectual trends that dominated 
the intellectual field (Kwok 1965). Berg-
son’s philosophy was indeed very much 
employed during the debate about Science 
and the outlooks on life (Kexue yu ren-
shengguan lunzhan 科學與人生觀論戰) 
that sparked between Zhang Junmai 張君
勱 (1887-1969) and Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 
(1887-1936) (Shino 2009). Bergson’s books 
were also strongly debated. His concept of 
“creative evolution” raised many discus-
sions in China. However, as Gao ruiquan 
rightly puts it, among the many aspects of 
Bergson’s philosophy, it was the concept 
“intuition” that was most highly regarded 
(Wu 2005: 7-10). It had a strong impact on 
modern Confucian Philosophy (Jing 2005; 
rošker 2016). In a seminal article on the 
concept of intuition in liang Shuming’s 
梁漱溟 (1893-1988) texts, An Yanming 
noted that “from the beginning, [intui-
tion (zhijue直覺)] has borne the apparent 
imprint of Henri Bergson’s Vitalism” (an 
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1997: 337). Taking this affirmation as a 
departure point, this paper questions the 
introduction of Bergson’s “intuition” in 
China and puts under light how Chinese 
philosophers understood “intuition” in a 
manner somehow very different from what 
Bergson had proposed at that time. 
the introduction of Bergson’s philoso-
phy in China is not a well-known topic in 
intellectual history. aside from lai Huei-
yun’s unpublished PhD dissertation (lai 
1993) and Wu Xianwu’s book (Wu 2005), 
no scholar, neither Westerner nor Chinese, 
has yet produced a full analysis of Bergson’s 
reception in China. Despite the influence of 
Bergson on several Chinese philosophers 
has already been studied; we still lack a 
broader picture of its reception. 
In my readings of Modern Chinese 
Philosophers, I have noticed a very im-
portant but neglected paradox: Chinese 
intellectuals used Bergson’s intuition as a 
device for ethical inquiries sooner than the 
philosopher himself even started to write 
his moral philosophy. Bergson published 
his moral philosophy only in 1932 with Les 
Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion. 
In the early twenties, most of Chinese in-
tellectuals took as a starting point of their 
considerations about Bergson’s philosophy 
a short text: “Introduction à la métaphy-
sique”. Originally published in 1903, it 
was an article concerning the methodology 
of philosophy, science and metaphysics. It 
stressed the importance of “intuition” as the 
very foundation of metaphysics. Bergson 
notably defended the claim that intuition, as 
the possibility to spiritually enter an object 
and share its duration, was the approach to 
absolute knowledge, while analysis, that is 
an intellectual construction whose buildings 
blocks are but symbols, was only giving ac-
cess to relative knowledge. Despite the fact 
that he made no reference to the question 
of morality, Chinese intellectuals read this 
paper as a method for moral philosophy 
and introspection. the translation of liu 
Shuya 劉叔雅 (1889-1985), also known 
as liu Wendian 劉文典 serves as a striking 
illustration. In his explanation of the word 
“intuition” (zhijue), he explicitly associated 
Bergson’s intuition with Cheng yi’s 程頤 
(1033-1107) “Knowledge of/as virtue” 
(dexing zhi zhi 德性之知)1. He clearly as-
sociated Bergson with Neoconfucianism.
to unravel this paradox, this paper will 
question Bergson’s Chinese reception by 
focusing on what Chinese Philosophers 
said about his “intuition”. But before giv-
ing voice to Bergson’s Chinese readers 
and commentators, one has first to become 
aware of the discrepancies and innovations 
produced by the translation and the presen-
tation of Bergson’s works in Chinese. to do 
so, I analyse two sets of documents: a selec-
tion of Chinese translations of “Introduction 
à la métaphysique”, published between 
1918 and 1921; and then the special issue 
of People’s Bell (Minduo 民鐸) dedicated to 
Bergson in 1921. taking these documents as 
a corpus to study, this article aims at answer-
ing the following question: Can we trace in 
the presentations of Bergson’s works the 
reasons why “intuition” was quickly associ-
ated with Confucian philosophy?
to answer this question, I shall dismiss 
the philosophical approach to the prob-
lem – that would have meant to propose 
a new reading of Bergson – and choose to 
1 My translation of Cheng yi’s wording is taken 
from Huang (2010: 66-67).
37
work in a framework closer to “conceptual 
history”. Writing a conceptual history of a 
modern Chinese concept, such as zhijue, is 
no easy task because western philosophical 
concepts were not simply translated through 
a process of word making. they were appro-
priated by Chinese intellectuals throughout 
what lydia liu had called “translingual 
practices” (liu 1995). as such, one has to 
resist the temptation of semantic transpar-
ency, “intuition” should not be considered 
as a unit-idea or a universal philosophical 
concept. as translation, especially from 
and into non-european languages and 
cultures, is but a recent historiographical 
issue (Burke 2012), it is important to be 
clear on the terminology. In this paper, I 
will follow Koselleck when he writes that 
“a word becomes a concept only when the 
entirety of meaning and experience within 
a sociopolitical context within which and 
for which a word is used can be condensed 
into one word ” (Koselleck 2004: 85, my 
emphasis). a concept can only be attached 
to one and only word. therefore, despite 
the fact that they are situated in the same 
semantic field, “intuition” and “zhijue” are 
not the same concept2. From a linguistic 
2  At first the world zhiguan 直觀 was used to trans-
late Bergson’s intuition (Qian 1914). However, in the 
early twenties, zhijue won primacy over zhiguan. In the 
1921 Minduo issue on Bergson, several authors used 
both the terms but zhiguan was mainly used in reference 
to German philosophers. It seems that for some of them 
zhijue was a translation of the French “intuition”, while 
zhiguan was a translation of the German Anschauung. 
See notably Fan Shoukan (1921) and li Shicen (1921). 
In Japan, it seems that zhiguan was more often used in 
the translation of German philosophy, while zhijue was 
used for English texts (Ishizuka 2003: 206). As Bergson 
was often translated from the english version of his text, 
this hypothesis could work for both countries. However 
a broad comparison of the two terms and their usage is 
still necessary. 
perspective, one never translates concepts 
but words. as a consequence, working on 
the appropriation of Bergson’s “intuition” 
in China means to focus on the emergence 
of a new concept to practice philosophy.
In a first section, I will present rapidly 
the conclusion I had reached in my previ-
ous study (Ciaudo 2013). This will give 
me the occasion to expose transformations 
that directly happened during the transla-
tion process. then I will consider how the 
concept “zhijue” was read as a method, a 
new philosophical method that could help 
to rebuild a modern Confucian philosophy. 
Confucianisation through  
Translation?
The article “Introduction à la métaphy-
sique”, first published in 1903, is a very 
important text for the history of Bergson’s 
Chinese reception. It was translated three 
times between 1918 and 1921. this shows 
not only the importance Chinese intellectu-
als gave to this article but also that the text 
and its translation were highly debated. In 
1918, liu Shuya published a translation 
of the first few pages of the text in The 
New Youth. the second translation was 
an abridged translation produced by Cai 
yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868-1940), and pub-
lished in 1921 in the special issue of the Peo-
ple’s Bell Magazine dedicated to Bergson. 
the last translation was written the same year 
by yang Zhengyu and was the only complete 
one. It was published into a book that turned 
out to be often reprinted during the republi-
can era. In this text, Bergson draws the lines 
between science and metaphysics, analysis 
and intuition. He also clearly defines for the 
first time his concept: 
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It follows from this that an absolute could 
only be given in an intuition, whilst eve-
rything else falls within the province of 
analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of 
intellectual sympathy by which one places 
oneself within an object in order to coincide 
with what is unique in it and consequently 
inexpressible. (Bergson 1912: 7; original 
emphasis; for the original French see Berg-
son 2011: 5)
Chinese translators all understood 
the importance of this paragraph. yang 
Zhengyu even underlined this short passage 
in order to indicate to his readers that this 
was a key definition in Bergson’s philoso-
phy (Yang 1921a: 7-8). The first thing to 
comment about the Chinese translations of 
this text is that nobody translated from the 
original version of the text. liu and yang 
worked from an english translation, while 
Cai translated from the German. although 
Bergson was known to proof-read his eng-
lish translations (Bergson 1912: iv), one has 
to consider whether some discrepancies or 
translation choices were made because of 
the German or english version of the text. 
For instance, in Cai’s version, “sympathie 
intellectuelle” turned into zhili de ganru 智
力的感入, a word mimicking the German 
“intellektueller Einfühlung” (Cai 1921: 85; 
Bergson 1909: 4). One also has to point out 
that the three translations didn’t use the 
same word for intuition: Liu choose zhijue, 
while the two others went with zhiguan 直
觀. Considering that in the modern language 
one now uses zhijue, one has to question 
why liu’s choice won the lexical battle. 
Zhijue was a brand-new word that bared no 
link to classical Chinese literature3, unlike 
3  By classical literature I understand mainly Con-
fucian literature used in the Imperial examination sys-
tem. Jue is of course a very important term in Chinese 
Buddhism. We can even find the sequence of the two 
zhiguan, which was incidentally an indirect 
reference to Shao yong 邵雍 (1011-1077) 
“considering things from things” (yi wu 
guan wu 以物觀物) (Ciaudo 2013: 321-
322). Liu Shuya didn’t invent the term as 
one can already find it in an encyclopaedia 
edited in 1911 (Huang 1911). But it is very 
clear that it was a neologism (Morgan 
1913). Despite this word not being linked to 
any older Confucian usage, it is interesting 
to note that as soon as liu translated the text, 
he associated “intuition” with Neoconfucian 
philosophy. after translating the paragraph 







the term zhijue is not very appropriate, while 
consulting the texts in European languages [I 
thought] that it was not different from what 
Cheng Zhengshu called the “knowledge of/
as virtue”. Master Cheng said: “Knowledge 
from seeing and hearing is not knowledge of/
as virtue. It results from the contact between 
one thing and another thing and therefore is 
not internal. the knowledge of those erudite 
and skilful persons belongs to this type of 
knowledge. Knowledge of/as virtue does 
not rely upon hearing and seeing”. this is in 
symbiosis with Bergson intuitive philosophy 
(Liu 1918: 102).
Hence, from the very first translation of 
Bergson’s “Introduction à la métaphysique”, 
“intuition” was associated to Cheng yi, and 
his “Knowledge of/as virtue” (dexing zhi zhi 
characters zhi and jue in the Chanyuan zhuquanji duxu
禪源諸詮集都序. However, the intellectuals who used 
zhijue to translate Berson’s “intuition” did not make ref-
erence to this text. I am very thankful to Professor Shino 
yoshinobu for indicating me this reference. 
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德性之知). liu also spoke of metaphysics in 
terms of as xing er shang xue 形而上學 an 
expression coined with Neoconfucian “First 
Philosophy” (Fang 2005). I shall not judge 
here whether this association is appropriated 
or not. My point is simply to underline the 
quick association to Neoconfucian philoso-
phy produced by liu Shuya, and raise the 
issue of how Chinese intellectuals and phi-
losophers read Western philosophy. One can 
also add that, in comparison to the two other 
translations, liu’s style tends to be more 
classical as he used many formal expressions 
taken from canonical texts such as “yi yan yi 
bi zhi 一言以蔽之” (The Analects II, 2) to 
say “in short”, “in brief”. the proximity of 
style may have helped the Chinese readers 
to associate Bergson with Confucian writing. 
Indeed, in a conference pronounced many 
years later, the philosopher He lin 賀麟 
(1902-1992) admitted, “when [Chinese intel-
lectuals] used to read Bergson’s books, they 
often found in them a scent of Chinese phi-
losophy. […] [Bergson’s philosophy] made 
[them] think about Laozi and Zhuangzi in 
pre-Qin philosophy and Wei-Jin period and 
about the lu-Wang school of Song and Ming 
dynasties” (He 1984: 21). As a consequence, 
one must insist on the role played by different 
“space of experience” (Erfahrungsraum) and 
“horizon of expectation” (Erwartungshori-
zont) between the european versions of the 
texts and the Chinese4. Bergson’s european 
readers didn’t have the same intellectual 
background as Chinese, and they had not 
the same uses for similar texts. In fact, one 
can even say that when he arrived in China, 
Bergson was almost completely cut off from 
4 For an explanation on these two historical catego-
ries see Koselleck (2004: 255-275). 
the “1900 philosophical moment” (Worms 
2009), the question of spiritualism and the 
heated debate around psychology. For ex-
ample, Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887-1969) 
who was considered as one of the greatest 
specialists of Bergson, spoke of Fechner 
law concerning the relationship between 
the physical magnitude of a stimulus and the 
intensity of its subjective perception as if it 
was completely accepted (Zhang 1981: 927). 
It seems that he was not aware that Bergson 
had denounced the “fallacy of Fechner’s 
reasoning” (Bergson 2013: 45-54).
another important discrepancy in the 
three Chinese translations should be men-
tioned. they all failed to translate “un ab-
solu”. this problem didn’t stir up because 
of the english or the German versions of 
the text, where one can read “ein Absolutes” 
(Bergson 1909, 2) and “one absolute” (Berg-
son 1912: 3). All Chinese translators crossed 
out the indefinite article before “absolute”. 
However, “getting access to one absolute” is 
not exactly the same thing as “getting access 
to (the) absolute”. Cai only used “absolute” 
as an adjective while liu and yang added a 
genitive to the expression. they both wrote 
“juedui zhi jing 絕對之境” that one could 
translate back into “the realm or field of 
absoluteness”. this discrepancy is impor-
tant, because by eliminating the pronoun, 
we tend to lean toward a more “mystical” 
approach to philosophy – a critic precisely 
raised by Dewey (Dewey 2008: 227) but 
also by some psychologists such as tang 
yue唐鉞 (1889-1987) (Tang 1923: 94)5. 
5 In Bergson’s philosophy, the term “absolute” is 
no infinite totality, but can be understood as the absolute 
quality of a thing perceived through an act of intuition, 
as opposed to the relative knowledge of the external 
world available to the intellect (Fink 1999: 22).
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But, let us turn back to Bergson’s original 
text. When he spoke of “possessing an 
absolute”, he was considering an “object 
in space”:
When I speak of an absolute movement, I am 
attributing to the moving object an interior 
and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply 
that I am in sympathy with those states, and 
that I insert myself in them by an effort of 
imagination. then, according as the object is 
moving or stationary, according as it adopts 
one movement or another, what I experience 
will vary. (Bergson 1912: 2; for the original 
French see Bergson 2011: 2)
Despite the expression “states of mind” 
(états d’âmes), Bergson’s “Introduction à la 
métaphysique” didn’t leave much space for 
a moralistic approach to his concepts. the 
key idea of the text was to defend the claim 
that “intuition” is the only total means of 
knowledge for something that is in move-
ment. to understand the movement of an 
object one would have entered in it, and 
share its duration. Duration and movement 
were considered here as the same (Bergson 
2011: 26). As such, “intuition” in Bergson’s 
sense was nothing else than “intuition of 
duration”. His philosophy was built on the 
idea that philosophers and scientists tend to 
consider time in a spatial framework, they 
translate it into symbols, and fail to grasp 
the real time that is duration. this point 
was somehow overlooked by its transla-
tors6. yang Zhengyu’s translation went 
even further by adding here a middle-title: 
“Introspection of oneself” (ziwo zhi neixing 
6 In a recent talk at the conference “Les échanges 
littéraires sino-français pendant la République de Chi-
ne (1912-1949)” (June 30-31, 2016) Shino Yoshinobu 
made the same remark about Zhang Dongsun’s trans-
lation of L’Evolution créatrice.
自我之內省)7. His wording clearly draws 
a bridge with Confucian practice of self-in-
trospection. It is interesting here to compare 
yang’s translation with Bergson’s original 
text, and Hulme’s english translation. One 
can see a progressive transvaluation:  
Il y a une réalité au moins que nous saisis-
sons tous du dedans, par intuition et non par 
simple analyse. C’est notre propre personne 
dans son écoulement à travers le temps. 
C’est notre moi qui dure. Nous pouvons ne 
sympathiser intellectuellement, ou plutôt 
spirituellement, avec aucune autre chose. 
Mais nous sympathisons sûrement avec 
nous-mêmes. (Bergson 2011: 6)
there is one reality, at least, which we all 
seize from within, by intuition and not by 
simple analysis. It is our own personality 
in its flowing through time – our self which 
endures. We may sympathize intellectually 
with nothing else, but we certainly sympat-






Our own personality in its flowing through 




From the French to the english, “per-
sonne” became “personality”, a slight 
change that could give way to a more “mor-
alistic” approach to the question of intuition. 
Nevertheless, such change remains minimal 
compared to the addition of the Chinese 
7 yang was probably following the example of the 
Japanese translation of the text (Beruguson 1913).  
8 yang made a grammatical mistake when adding 
the French. It should be “Moi qui dure”. 
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translator. yang Zhengyu reformulated the 
text, giving it a preaching overtone. One 
could translate his text as follows:
Some people think that seizing reality by 
relying simply on inner intuition and not 
using simple analysis is difficult. Today [we] 
explain them with clarity and dispel their 
uncertainty. In [our] every day [experience] 
there is a reality that we can all grasp. this 
reality, what is it? It is our own personality in 
its flowing through time (Our own personali-
ty in its flowing through time), the ever-en-
during self (Moi qui dure). We are mentally 
and physically separated from other things, 
“intellectually sympathizing” with them is 
all the more estranging. therefore I invite 
you first to sympathize with your own self. 
If Bergson was not totally lost in transla-
tion in this paragraph, one can clearly see 
that his philosophy was presented under a 
propaedeutic approach, bringing him closer 
to the idea of “self-cultivation”. Chinese 
readers were first invited to sympathize with 
their inner selves before being able to do so 
with other objects. as such, the translation 
of “intuition” didn’t simply induce a mor-
alization of Bergson’s key concept by asso-
ciating it with moral concerns. the Chinese 
translations also built a bridge between its 
philosophy and the issue of self-cultivation 
by reformulating Bergson’s style and tone. 
How Bergson turned Confucian: 
Intuition as a Method
aside from the role played by translation 
in the confucianisation of intuition, the 
focus on “intuition” as a method to prac-
tice philosophy had a great impact on the 
reception of Bergson. the translation of 
“intuition” into zhijue was in this regard 
key to the matter, because this word could 
be read as a verb, which meant “to perceive 
directly” (see notably yang 1921b)9. With 
Bergson’s wording, Chinese philosophers 
found a modern neologism to make ex-
plicit the means of knowledge that their 
own intellectual traditions had pointed at. 
It is worth mentioning that all the authors 
in the People’s Bell issue – whether they 
considered Bergson’s philosophy strictly 
from the perspective of Western philosophy 
(for instance li Shicen and Fan Shoukang) 
or in relation with Chinese philosophies – 
insisted on the fact that for Bergson “intui-
tion” was a method that held a central place 
in his philosophy. and they were right. after 
all, as Deleuze once phrased it, intuition 
was “the method of bergsonism” (Deleuze 
1966: 1). The definition of intuition as the 
method of metaphysics in “Introduction à 
la métaphysique” (1903) had profoundly 
informed Bergson’s reception on the Chi-
nese intellectual scene10. Feng youlan who 
was at that time infatuated with Bergson’s 
philosophy saw in intuition “a revolution 
in the philosophic method” (yi ge zhexue 
fangfa de geming 一個哲學方法的革命) 
(Feng 1921: 15). He described Bergson’s 
intuition as a strong blow against european 
intellectualism. Bergson was “attacking the 
role given by intellectualism to ‘analysis’ but 
not the ‘analysis’ itself” (Feng 1921: 21). An 
original aspect of Feng’s text is that it tried 
to link the concept of intuition with native 
Chinese philosophies: first with Mozi’s 
“perception” (qinzhi 親知) then with Con-
fucian introspection (Feng 1921: 17-18). 
9  In the Minduo issue I haven’t found any zhiguan 
that could be read as such. this verbal reading of zhijue 
may have helped in its progressive supremacy over zhi-
guan. 
10 As soon as 1914, Qian Zhixiu already identified 
in “intuition” Bergson’s most important concept. 
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as such, he built bridges between China 
and the West, and, in the same time, he in-
sisted on the fact that Chinese thought was 
philosophical. In associating Chinese native 
intellectual trends with Bergsonism, Chi-
nese philosophers insisted on the idea that 
Chinese was worth naming a philosophy. 
In the case of Bergson, the association 
was not a new idea. In a text appraising yuan 
Shikai’s 袁世凱 (1859-1916) restoration of 
Confucius’ worshiping rituals, Zhang Dong-
sun 張東蓀(1886-1973) already defended 
that Bergson and Confucius were both hu-
manist thinkers (Zhang Dongsun 1913). In 
1919, tang Hualong 湯化龍 (1874-1918) 
who wrote a preface for Zhang Dongsun’s 
translation of L’évolution créatrice saw 
in Bergson a “canal to thread together the 
Western and the eastern Civilization” (wei 
Dong Xiyang wenming guantong zhi qu 為
東西洋文明貫通之渠) (Bogesen 1919: 4). 
Before 1921, Bergson was however most 
often associated with Buddhism, and more 
specifically Yogācāra School, also known 
as Vijñānavāda. In fact, liu Shuya associa-
tion of Bergson’s intuition with Cheng yi’s 
“Knowledge of/as virtue” was criticized by 
Zhang Shouming張壽明, who considered 
that Bergson’s philosophy had no link with 
Confucianism. If a bridge with an asian tra-
dition should absolutely be built, it ought to 
be with Buddhism (Zhang Shouming 1918). 
around 1921 there was a debate between 
Zhang taiyan 章太炎 (1869-1936) and Lü 
Cheng吕澂 (1896-1989) on the proximity 
of Bergson’s philosophy with Buddhism, 
and more specifically Vijñānavāda. Since 
the discussions of this debate have already 
been analysed elsewhere (yao 2014), I shall 
only summarize here a few key points. 
Zhang, who had planned to compare Berg-
son and Vijñānavāda since 1917 (Lai 1993: 
49-50), tried to bring together the epistemo-
logical categories of western philosophy 
and Vijñānavāda. He considered that the 
concepts of “experience” (shiyan 實驗) and 
“ideas” (lixiang 理想) were similar to the 
Buddhist notions of Pratyaksha (xianliang 
現量) and Anumāna (biliang 比量). Depart-
ing from that affirmation, he went on to af-
firm that Bergson’s intuition was somehow 
similar to the eighth consciousness in the 
Vijñānavāda, the ālayavijñāna (Zang shi 藏
識) or “the warehouse-consciousness”, that 
is the unutterable state where all the states of 
consciousness are been given birth. He even 
stated that “Bergson could catch a glimpse 
of the warehouse-consciousness” (Bogesen 
shi poneng kuijian zangshi 柏格森氏頗能
窺見藏識) (quoted in yao 2014, 85). It is 
notable that the association of Bergson to 
Buddhism was somehow facilitated by the 
way yang Zhengyu had translated some 
parts of Introduction to metaphysics. In his 
translation le déroulement d’un rouleau 
turned into “reincarnation” (lunhui 輪迴) 
(Yang 1921a: 13). When Bergson wrote “une 
conscience sans mémoire[…] périrait et re-
naîtrait donc sans cesse”, yang used again 
the Buddhist terminology of shengsheng 
miemie 生生滅滅 (Yang 1921a: 15)11. at 
some point, Bergson’s philosophy also em-
ployed the same metaphorical apparatus as 
the Vijñānavāda school. the ālayavijñāna 
is often compared in classical texts to a 
never-ending river flow, a metaphor also 
used in Bergson’s philosophy to designate 
life. as in Bergson’s philosophy, man can 
grasp life through intuition, the proximity 
11 These discrepancies were first identified by Lai 
1993: 171-174.  
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between his philosophy and Vijñānavāda 
was easy to point at. Zhang’s position was 
supported by the linguist li Jingxi 黎錦熙 
(1890-1978), who also identified together 
the two notions, and even went to the point 
of seeing Bergson’s intuition as a means to 
attain the ālayavijñāna (Li Jinxi 1921: 3). 
This association was also to influence Li 
Shicen who in his book-review about liang 
Shuming’s Culture of East and West and 
their philosophy, later wrote that Bergson’s 
philosophy was too easy and plain, and it 
ought to be studied from the point of view 
of Vijñānavāda (Chen 1985: 502-503).
However this association between the 
Bergsonian intuition and Vijñānavāda hold 
on several grounds that were soon to be at-
tacked. lü Cheng who rejected the assimila-
tion of the ālayavijñāna to Bergson’s phi-
losophy, declared that people tended to look 
at Bergsonism and Vijñānavāda as alike 
thought systems only because they shared 
the river flow metaphor (Lü 1921: 4)12. In 
an article, he pointed out many differences 
between Bergson and the Buddhist school. 
One of the most interesting criticisms he 
raised was the problem of memory – another 
key concept of Bergson’s philosophy. lü 
was right when he noted that Bergson’s 
philosophy had been built on a theory of 
memory13. this was in total contradiction 
with ālayavijñāna which is memoryless. In 
12 le Dœuff 1980 has notably put forward the im-
portance of metaphors in the understanding of philo-
sophical system. 
13 It is often said that chronology is very important 
to understand Bergson’s philosophy. Henri Gouhier 
who was one of the first of Bergson’s editors noted that 
“chronology indicates the direction of Bergsonism” 
(Gouhier 1984: viii). One ought to read his books in the 
chronological order. Matiére et Mémoire was published 
in 1896 just before the “Introduction à la métaphy-
sique”, as such lü’s comments here show that he under-
stood the links between Bergson’s works.
several texts (Liang 2005a: 275-280; Liang 
1921), liang Shuming also has thrown very 
strong blows against Zhang’s approximate 
comparative philosophy. according to li-
ang, Vijñānavāda approach of knowledge 
was built on two consecutive stages: first the 
genesis of consciousness (the xianliang 現
量 stage) and the time of logic (the biliang 
比量 stage). For him, Vijñānavāda was not 
only completely against intuition, but it 
was also the best epistemological doctrine. 
He even wrote that Vijñānavāda was the 
only method of metaphysics (Liang 2005a: 
278). Bergson was here clearly belittled.14 
By refusing to link Bergson to Buddhism, 
liang was in fact defending the complexity 
of Buddhist epistemology and metaphys-
ics. In the end, people who had defended 
the comparison agreed that Buddhism was 
above Bergsonism. as a consequence, 
bringing the two together was no longer that 
important. In his interview with Zhang Jun-
mai and lin Zaiping, Bergson also rejected 
the idea that his philosophy had anything to 
do with Buddhism (Zhang 1921: 13). The 
debate was closed. 
Before continuing let us add a few words 
on liang Shuming’s uses of the concept of 
zhijue. as an yanming already shown, in 
liang’s texts, zhijue could be understood in 
three senses: “They are zhijue as a method 
of knowledge, zhijue as an equivalent of 
benneng 本能, and zhijue as an equivalent 
of liangzhi 良知” (An 1997: 347). This 
last understanding is important because, 
14 One has however to be careful with liang Shum-
ing’s opinion on the question of the links between Berg-
son’s intuition and Buddhist terminology. In a very short 
period of time, he had repeatedly changed his mind. as 
we can see in Culture of East and West, where he assimi-
lated “intuiton” with the Buddhist concept of feiliang 
非量 (Liang 2005b: 399). See An (1997).
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it created a new link between Bergson’s 
philosophy and Chinese Confucian tradi-
tion. In his Culture of East and West, liang 
Shuming associated “intuition” with both 
Mencius and Confucius. also by equating 
benevolence (ren 仁) with “intuition”, li-
ang put forward the idea that intuition was 
to help a man to grasp the meaning of life, 
and, moreover, to realize its inner virtues. 
upheld as the key idea of Confucianism, 
“intuition” was to characterize the entire 






the Confucians say that “What Heaven has 
conferred is called the Nature; an accordance 
with this Nature is called the Path of Duty”. 
One ought therefore to follow one’s nature. 
[…] This knowledge and this ability are what 
Mencius spoke of as the intuitive ability that 
men possess without having acquired it by 
learning, and the intuitive knowledge that 
they possessed without the need to exercise 
their thoughts. In modern terms, I would 
speak of intuition (zhijue). (Liang 2005b: 
452, classical quotations adapted from leg-
ge’s translation)
Of course, liang was not drawing 
here a clear parallel between Bergson and 
Confucian philosophy. He didn’t compare 
Bergson with Mencius. However, by us-
ing this word (zhijue) associated with the 
Bergsonian intuition, he brought together 
Bergson and Confucianism. When talk-
ing about zhijue, liang approached it as a 
method to behave in life. Intuition was the 
key dimension of Chinese’s attitude toward 
life (Zhongguo rensheng taidu 中國人生態
度). as such, he kept the Bergsonian idea 
that “intuition” was the medium for access 
to life. 
this focus on the function and the 
method of “intuition” is also obvious in 
the interview that Zhang Junmai and lin 
Zaiping had with the French philosopher. 
Most of their questions revolved around the 
practice of intuition. almost as soon as the 
interview began, Zhang and lin asked ques-
tions about how to implement “intuition” 
in our daily lives. “Is the intuitive method 
inborn, or can it be cultivated (xiuyang 
修养)?” asked Zhang, while Lin enquired, 
“how to put in practice the intuitive method? 
Can it be taught?” (Zhang 1921: 12). They 
discussed whether intuition could be un-
derstood as a type of meditation. Zhang 
spoke of jingshen shang qianxiu gongfu 
精神上潛修功夫, “spiritual self-cultivation 
practice” (he added in brackets “medita-
tion”), while lin Zaiping spoke of jingzuo 
静坐, “silence-sitting”, a term associated to 
Neo-Confucian meditation. lin and Zhang 
were looking for concrete means to realize 
“intuition” in their life; they wanted to know 
how to practice an activity that would lead 
them to a better understanding of the world 
and themselves. this interview of Bergson, 
that soon became become authoritative 
(Cai 1984: 361-362; Guo 1936: 273-275), 
is important because it clearly connected 
the dots between Bergson’s philosophy and 
Confucian terminology. While answering a 




則也 (Dialectic) : 就積極言之, 則自察也 
(Self-observation) 內省也 (Introspection)。
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There are no definitive terms to speak about 
intuition, speaking about it in the negative 
sense, it is no analysis, no hairsplitting, 
no dialectic: speaking about it in the af-
firmative sense, it is self-observation and 
introspection.
While translating Bergson’s words into 
Chinese, Zhang Junmai produced cultural 
echoes. Whereas zicha 自察 is not a very 
often used term15, neixing 內省 is a clear 
reference to the favourite disciple of Confu-
cius, yanhui 颜回 (The Analects XII, 4). It 
is also a term that one can find in The State 
of Equilibrium and Harmony (Zhong yong 
中庸). For Zhang Junmai but also Feng 
youlan, Bergson’s “intuition” found its 
place in a discourse about self-introspection 
(neixing 内省) – a wording also referring 
to Zengzi 曾子 threefold introspection (wu 
ri san xing 吾日三省) (The Analects I, 4). 
Feng youlan considered that zhijue could be 
linked to Zengzi self-introspection because 
it designated a non-analytic appreciation 
of conscience (Feng 1921: 18-19). He 
reckoned that not anyone was able to attain 
Master Zeng level, however everyone was 
capable of accessing one’s consciousness 
(yishi 意識) through intuition. In his confer-
ence in China, John Dewey had character-
ized Bergson’s philosophy as a philosophy 
that “assigns a major role to introspection” 
(Dewey 2008: 221). The translation in 
Chinese was, however, going further than 
simply speaking of intuition as introspection 
practice. the very word used to translate 
this term turned “intuition” into a practice 
of superior men, or men of good (junzi 君
子). this association is obvious when one 
15 One can find it notably in The Historical Annals 
of Sima Qian, or in the Book of the Han.
considers Zhang Junmai’s comment about 
Bergson’s book L’énergie spirituelle. 
Published in 1919, this book brought 
together several conferences that Bergson 
had given during the two preceding decades. 
Despite the fact that it was only translated 
into Chinese in 1924, many commentators 
of Bergson made reference to it. During 
the 1923 controversy over science and 
metaphysics, Zhang often made reference 
to Bergson to defend his position. about 







Bergson states categorically that the use of 
reason is not appropriate to seize reality. 
Furthermore, what one calls reality, what 
one calls life, is but the movement and the 
spontaneity of men invisible thoughts. Since 
it can’t be grasped in the field of reason, there 
is only one method: the intuition. This is the 
content of Bergson’s metaphysics. 
However, the most important quotation 
of Bergson in Zhang’s text is a passage that 
doesn’t mention directly the “intuition”. 
towards the end of his plea, Zhang quoted 
a long excerpt from Bergson’s article “la 












之啟示者也。 (Zhang Junmai 1981: 976; for 
the original French see Bergson 2009b: 25)16
In man alone, especially among the best of 
mankind, the vital movement pursues its 
way without hindrance; this vital movement 
thrusting through the human body, which 
it has created on its way, spur the creative 
current of the moral life. Man, called on at 
every moment to lean on the totality of his 
past in order to bring his weight to bear more 
effectively on the future, is the great success 
of life. the moral man, who is a creator in 
the highest degrees, the man whose action, 
itself intense, is also capable of intensifying 
the action of other men, and, itself generous, 
can kindle fires on the hearths of generosity. 
The men of moral […] are revealers of me-
taphysical truth.” (translation adapted from 
Bergson and Carr 1920: 31-32)





these words embrace the ideas of our past 
saints regarding the fulfilment of one’s na-
ture through education-transformation. One 
can find true principles in the self-cultivation 
activities of illustrating illustrious virtues, 
of examining oneself on three points, and 
of subduing one’s self and returning to pro-
priety. these are not empty talks. (Zhang 
Junmai 1981: 976) 17
the quoted paragraph doesn’t mention 
the word “intuition”, but it is present in the 
following lines of the original text. In fact, 
this paragraph could be considered as a 
16 Zhang was quoting from the French version. It is 
a passage that Zhang often quoted at that time, see for 
instance Zhang Junmai 1981: 321.
17 the classical Confucian expressions are taken 
from the first sentence of the Great Study, The Ana-
lects I, 4 and XII, 1.
nexus in Bergson’s work, since the analysis 
published in the recent critical edition of 
Bergson’s L’énergie spirituelle note that 
many dimensions of Les Deux sources de 
la Morale et de la Religion are already 
contained in this paragraph in potential-
ity (Bergson 2009b: 246)18. Despite his 
obvious defence of Confucianism, Zhang 
was in fact putting the finger on a key pas-
sage of Bergson’s work, a passage from 
which Bergson would later develop his own 
moral philosophy. He anticipated a possible 
development of Bergson’s philosophy. as 
such, by moralizing Bergson’s intuition, 
Chinese translators and interpreters were 
not completely betraying the French phi-
losopher, but also saw in his philosophy a 
potential moral philosophy at the right spot. 
L’énergie spirituelle was also an impor-
tant source of inspiration for Neo-Confucian 
thinkers, because in the conference “Fan-
tomes de vivants et recherche psychique” 
presented before the Society for Psychical 
Research of London in 1913, Bergson had 
proposed a train of thoughts on which could 
be built a discourse in defence of lixue 理學 
and xinxue 心學 legitimacy. Bergson said:
I have sometimes asked myself what would 
have happened if modern science, instead 
of setting out from mathematics to turn its 
direction toward mechanics, physics and 
chemistry, instead of bringing all its forces 
to converge on the study of matter, had 
begun by consideration of mind – if Kepler, 
Galileo and Newton, for example, had been 
psychologists. they would have produced 
a psychology of which today we can form 
no idea, just as before Galileo no one could 
have imagined what our physics would be, 
a psychology which probably would have 
been to our present psychology what our 
18 “the moral man” was indeed to become a very 
important key word in Bergson’s last book.
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physics is to that of aristotle. Foreign to 
every mechanistic idea, science would have 
studied eagerly, instead of dismissing a 
priori, phenomena such as those you study; 
perhaps “psychical research” would have 
stood out as its principal preoccupation. 
(Bergson 1920: 98-99; for the original Berg-
son 2009b: 80-81)
after formulating these ideas, Berg-
son was soon to “wake from saying [this 
dream]” (Bergson 1920: 101). But Chinese 
philosophers were to prolong it. What if 
Song studies (Song xue 宋學) on the mind 
had been this “science” which emerged 
on the “consideration of mind”? This idea 
clearly crossed Feng youlan’s mind (Mas-
son 1985: 4-8.), and probably on many other 
Confucian thinkers’. the translation of 
“psychology” into xinli xue 心理學, a word 
that could also be understood as the “study 
on the mind and the Principle” may not have 
been totally innocent in this association.
Conclusion 
to conclude, I argue that the association of 
Bergson’s intuition with Confucian moral 
philosophy was the result of selective but 
complex appropriation of Bergson’s work. 
First, translation played a very important 
role in this process: by associating Berg-
son’s intuition with Cheng yi’s “knowledge 
of/as virtue”, Liu Shuya opened a road 
toward the emergence of a modern Chinese 
concept, associated with Confucian philoso-
phy. authors such as liang Shuming, Feng 
youlan and Zhang Junmai then stressed the 
link between “intuition” and Confucian phi-
losophy by either focusing on the question 
of “self-introspection”, “self-cultivation” or 
“innate knowledge”. However this associa-
tion was only made possible thanks to the 
dismissal of Bergson’s original arguments 
and their development. Indeed, Bergson’s 
intuition was cut off from the question du-
ration. In China, it was also progressively 
disconnected from Buddhist typology. 
When thinkers such as Zhang taiyan and 
li Jinxi drew lines between “intuition” 
and traditional Buddhist concepts such as 
Pratyaksha (xianliang 現量) and Anumāna 
(biliang 比量), they kept Bergson in the 
epistemological field. However, he didn’t 
hold long there for even the ones who de-
fended this association, though in the end 
that Buddhist typology was more precise. 
Cut off from its roots and from Chinese 
epistemological concepts, “intuition” as 
zhijue turned into a method to know oneself. 
as such, in the early twenties, Bergson’s 
intuition met its Confucian fate: moraliza-
tion, a process that would have a negative 
influence on the posterity of Bergson philos-
ophy in China. as lai Huei-yun showed it in 
her PhD dissertation, Bergson’s philosophy 
was to be belittled in China after 1924. that 
year, the Confucian thinkers were considered 
as the losers of the debate over science and 
metaphysics, and Bergson, who had been one 
of their forefront intellectual supports, fell 
with his proponents. Bergson’s philosophy 
was to be less and less studied in China, but 
zhijue was to continue its own trajectory in 
the history of Chinese philosophy.   
In the end, despite his provocative 
formulation, I think we can agree with 
Henrik Stenius (2004) when he defended 
that translation may emasculate concepts. 
Indeed, Bergson was completely cut out 
of the philosophical moment in which 
he found its place, and his intuition was 
disconnected from the core concept of his 
philosophy – duration. In the end, the Berg-
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sonian intuition turned into a philosophical 
tool for Neo-Confucian philosophy. Chinese 
readers found in Bergson a philosophy as 
method and not as content. Nevertheless, 
one should perhaps be moderate about these 
comments. By focusing on the question of 
intuition from a moral perspective, Chinese 
intellectuals partially betrayed the Bergson 
of 1903, but they partly announced the one 
of 1932. In his preface to Caterina Zanfi’s 
study on Bergson’s reception in Germany, 
Frédéric Worms noted that the different 
translation and understanding of Bergson 
throughout Germany all pinpointed at 
“singular aspects of Bergson’s work” (Zanfi 
2013: 9). Perhaps one could say the same 
thing about its Chinese reception: in the 
“moral-man” of the L’énergie spirituelle 
Confucianists saw the Confucian man of 
good (junzi 君子), the great philosopher or 
the great mystic that would be put under 
light by Bergson in 1932.
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bergsono „intuicija“ kinijoje ir jos konfucinė Plėtotė (1915–1923):  
keletas Pastabų aPie zhijUE moderniojoje kinijos filosofijoje
joseph ciaudo 
Santrauka. Straipsnyje tiriamas Henri Bergsono filosofinių raštų vertimas ir jo santykis su intuicijos (zhijue 
直覺) sąvokos raida šiuolaikinėje Kinijos filosofijoje. Bergsono intuicijos sąvoka buvo greitai susieta su 
„pažinimo dorybe“ (dexing zhi zhi 德性之知) ir virto viena pagrindinių modernių kiniškų sąvokų, kuriomis 
svarstomi etiniai ir moraliniai klausimai. Tačiau kinų filosofai ėmė naudoti Bergsono intuiciją kaip moralės 
filosofijos instrumentą anksčiau, nei pats Bergsonas pradėjo rašyti apie moralės filosofiją. Šiame straipsnyje 
išaiškinamas intuicijos sumoralinimas kiniškame kontekste bei keliamas klausimas apie zhijue sąvokos 
susiformavimą. Pagrindiniai šiame straipsnyje analizuojami dokumentai yra kiniški „Metafizikos įvado“ (1903) 
vertimai ir keletas apie 1921 m. pasirodžiusių straipsnių, susijusių su Bergsonu.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Bergsonas, intuicija, vertimas, konfucianizmas, budizmas
Įteikta 2016 m. rugpjūčio 30 d.
